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EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION/REFUGEE CRISIS: 
OPENING THE PANDORA’S BOX? 
Abstract 
The paper examines the EU's challenges in the field of migration, and suggests how 
Brussels and EU governments might promote its own form of order, and suggestions on how 
to reframe current approaches to facilitate a more effective and appropriate response.  
A European Agenda on Migration was published in May 2015 bringing together the 
different steps the EU must take to build a coherent and comprehensive approach to 
migration. However, EU member-states are still falling to find a mutual solution and adequate 
response, leaving hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants vulnerable. 
What are the origins of the current crisis? Why are the current policy instruments and 
actions insufficient to deal with it? What can be done to address the real causes of the present 
crisis? How can we enhance the EU’s common action and set out an effective and efficient 
EU migration policy? This paper will try to give answers to these and other questions in order 
to explain the political, legal and institutional aspects of this highly complex phenomenon. In 
conclusion, a few proposals will be put forward for possible solutions. 
Key words: European Union, migration, refugees, crisis, solutions. 
1. FIRST PREVIOUS QUESTION: ARE THE FACTS IN FAVOUR?
The migration/refugee issue is probably the most complex and controversial issue 
Europe is facing after the Second World War. Although it is not unique in its reasons, the 
current crisis became highly intensive political issue, on one side, generating political and 
public debates, while on the other side evokes tensions among EU member-states on how to 
cope with the constant flow of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, thus aggravating 
previous weaknesses in Europe’s immigration system. The strong commitment, conviction 
and determination of those trying to reach the European borders, reflects the degree of despair 
and insecurity in their own states. In the meantime, EU and member-states still lacks of 
adequate response, leaving thousands of refugees and other migrants more vulnerable. 
If we consider the facts, the situation is not looking any better on the ground, it is 
going even worse. Compared to 2014, the latest Frontex data shows that there is an increase 
of 149% of migrants flow in 2015. The numbers are rising because of the existence of other 
additional crossing-points. Today, It is not only the Mediterranean as the only option, but also 
the crossing-point at the border of Greece, on Hungarian border with Serbia and the port of 
Calais between UK and France. Migrants arrive through irregular channels in overloaded 
boats, by train through Balkans, on foot through Sahara desert or hidden in vehicles, but they 
are still coming in large numbers. 
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If we look at the dark side of this crisis, the numbers are terrifying. In the past 15 years 
more than 22.000 men, women and children died trying to reach Europe by crossing the 
Mediterranean. Most of them were running from conflicts and poverty from states like Syria, 
Iraq, Somalia and South Sudan. Since 2014, more than 1 million people arrived on borders of 
Europe in search of better life. The death of migrants and refugees trying to reach shores of 
Italy, Greece and Spain in 2015 is more than 4.000, with an average of 11 deaths per day, a 
massive number with no signs of reduction.  
We could also search for some irony in these numbers from one not long ago case 
study. In October 2013, since 366 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean near Italy, EU 
approved money for Italy to use its rescue patrols. These rescue patrols saved more than 
thousands of lives, until EU decided to withdraw the assistance, with an argument that the 
patrols with their rescue tasks are simply encouraging the migrants in undertaking dangerous 
journeys, knowing they have a bigger chance to be saved. After the death of 800 refugees in 
April 2015, EU reviewed its decision, promising the previous level funds. At the same time, it 
proposed military actions for destroying smugglers ships, but the plan was quickly 
condemned by the EU itself.  
Europe Migration Agenda was published in May 2015 uniting different steps from 
which EU should build coherent and comprehensive approach on migration. European 
Council meeting on 20
th
 of July adopted a Resolution for relocation of 40.000 people from 
Italy and Greece and a Resolution for resettlement of 22.504 displaced persons from outside 
the EU.
233
 The Council formally should have adopted the decision in September, but member-
states failed to agree regarding the distribution of asylum-seekers. 
 
2. SECOND PREVIOUS QUESTION: WHAT IS THE PROFILE OF 
MIGRANTS/REFUGEES?  
 
As abovementioned, the flow of refugees and migrants in Europe undoubtedly and 
dramatically increased. But, also the profile of those arriving in Europe dramatically changed. 
Traditionally, majority of migrants seeking entrance in Europe were individual men. Today, 
whole families travel together, in some cases with elder and immovable relatives and often 
with small children. According data from UNHCR, 13% of new arrivals in 2015 were women 
and 18% children. Routes they undertake are quite dramatic, mostly with swift shifting 
because of border restrictions or safety concerns in transit countries. The situation with 
children migrants, especially those travelling alone, is of great concern. There are reports of 
children with no accompaniment and disappearing immediately after their arrival in Europe, 
raising the fears that they might fell in the hands of human traffickers.
234
  
According UNHCR, in 2015 more than 80% of migrants and refugees arriving in 
Europe comes from the first ten countries that produce refugees. More than 50% are from 
Syria, 15% from Afghanistan, 6% from Eritrea and 4% from Iraq – all of them in conflicts or 
crisis. Largest number of asylum applications in EU is from Syria, but applications from 
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 Squires, N. (2015) “More Than 5,000 Migrant Children Disappear in Italy after Crossing the Mediterranean”. 
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Afghanistan and Eritrea are also in significant number.
235
 Also, there are a large number of 
people seeking entrance in Europe whose eligibility for international protection is complex or 
maybe travel mostly for economic reasons. These people use the same routes as those running 
from conflicts or violence. While refugees are mostly consider as especially vulnerable, this 
current surge illustrates that, regardless the starters of migration or the individual status, the 
risks migrants are facing during their use of illegal routes is significant, including physical 
danger, exploitation, human trafficking, sexual violence and extortion.  
Significant is the situation of Lebanon. In recent years the number of Syrian refugees 
accepted by Lebanon reached 1.2 million people. This is more than the number of migrants in 
whole Europe and 50 times more than the agreement of EU member-states for resettlement of 
migrants in the future. Increased border restrictions introduced by Lebanon during 2015 
means that it is become difficult for Syrian refugees to access Lebanon; all entry access are 
denied except those with proofs of having financial assets necessary for residence. It is simply 
not possible to secure educational and job opportunities that everyone is seeking.   
In the last 12 months, young educational women and children are being noticed 
arriving in Lebanon from Syria. They are leaving Syria because that, regardless of the rhetoric 
and diplomatic initiatives, the peace resolution for the conflict is not becoming evident. Most 
of the young people in the first years of the conflict volunteered for support of those affected 
by the crisis when the conflict was not that much fragmented and wide-spread and before the 
social and economical impact of four years of war that destroyed their options. Especially the 
pressure on young men to join the army is big and they continue to leave the country in order 
to avoid forced recruitment. Even before the actual situation, EU member-states tend to look 
at any large-scale migration as a threat to their sovereignty, national borders and economies. 
Most of the EU member-states duly reacted, strengthening the controls of illegal access to 
their territories.
236
 These increased restrictions were not effective in stopping the flow of 
migrants and refugees; instead, they resulted in increased effort for arriving in Europe, 
exposing already vulnerable migrants to a more physical and other risks. 
 
3. THIRD PREVIOUS QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF THE 
CURRENT CRISIS?  
 
2015 brought a new level of urgency regarding migration crisis. That Europe is 
fighting with issue of how to cope with the migration/refugee crisis is nothing new, but the 
number of refugees seeking entrance in Europe has risen to a degree that makes the politics 
and actions outdated.There are several reasons for the actual refugee crisis. The first and most 
important is the change evoked by conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East and the political 
turmoil in Africa resulting in disintegrated, barely functional or destructed states, incapable of 
securing security and prosperity for its own citizens. Today, most of the states from the 
region, such as Jordan and Lebanon, are home for these refugees. But there are little or no 
chances for integration or security in states of first destination. These states neither have the 
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capacities or the mechanisms for adequate response and the new flow of refugees from Syria 
and Iraq seriously endangers their security, such as the case of recent bomb-attacks in Turkey 
and the instability in Libya. Consequently, most people choose to go to Europe, where the 
right of asylum must be guaranteed. 
The radical changes introduced by the Arabian Spring and the removal of dictators in 
most of the Arabian states gave fresh impulse on migration movement. The crisis in Syria that 
escalated in high complex and long intern conflict evoked massive resettlement of people in 
and out of the country. The case of Libya showed to be even more difficult. More than 12 
million Syrian people are in need of humanitarian aid and over 4 million, according the 
UNHCR are displaced. Iraqis people, also confront with the revival of violence and conflicts, 
including the influence of the so-called Islamic State. This does not mean that the people in 
Africa do not deserve or are not prepared for democracy, but the way these changes happened, 
the speed of events and the management of consequences left many pies in the sky. What is 
more important, the fall of old, non-democracy regimes, did not address the key issues 
causing the turmoil: lack of economic possibilities and future for Arabian youth. 
Another aspect of the current crisis might assign to the lasting conflicts in many 
African states characterized with weak economies, repression and lack of freedom, 
dysfunctional institutions and dictatorship. Migrants around Sahara are from Afghanistan, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria, Eritrea and others, where 
long lasting conflicts and crisis are threat for millions of civilian lives, forcing them to leave 
its states in search of safety and security in Europe. In the meantime, the international 
community response on the situation is totally inadequate. According UNHCR, 86% of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan and 70% in Lebanon live below the poverty line. 
The failure of the international community to address these conflicts, violence and 
human rights abuses in states of origin is another key factor in favour of the illegal migration 
wave in Europe. Both, international political frame for ending the conflict in Syria and clear 
international strategy for addressing the conflict in Iraq are missing. Afghanistan is far away 
of real stability, despite the years of international intervention and the international 
community seems clueless in ending the long lasting conflict in Somalia.   
Member-states and the EU itself failed to understand the hidden depth of ethnical and 
religious separation and to estimate the consequences of these fundamental changes.  The test 
at the beginning proved to be very difficult for the European foreign policy, at that time 
struggling around the establishment of the European External Action Service and the inner 
political dichotomy regarding implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, the EU 
approach on challenges caused by the migration/refugee crisis was mostly reactive instead of 
proactive and oriented simply on shaping events.  
 
 
4. EU IN CHARGE: LEGAL FRAME 
 
EU member-states made long-term commitments according the international law on 
human rights and rights on refugees, in protection and promotion of human rights for all 
migrants regardless of their status. As signatories to the Convention on Refugees from 1951 
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and the Protocol from 1967
237
, these states have specific responsibilities in securing 
international protection for persons in danger of being prosecuted. The Convention obligates 
member-states to grant refugee rights on work, education, housing and legal system and to 
protect them from punishment for illegal entrance. The non-refoulement principle stipulated 
in the Convention is an international common law norm and therefore an obligation for all 
states regardless whether they are signatories or not.  Migrants which are not in the frame of 
the Convention definition are protected according the wider frame of international human 
rights. However, today there is not a universally accepted legal definition for “migrant”.  
Asylum and migration were not always in EU jurisdiction. Tampere Council 
Conclusions in 1999 marked the beginning of EU policies in migration area through the 
creation of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
238
 Unlike other regional bodies, EU has not 
yet accepted any Convention on refugees or fully integrated common asylum and migration 
policy, although the European law on human rights is applied for protection of all migrants. 
Although the EU’s sphere of actions comprises of different aspects, including the 
cooperation with third states of origin and transit of migrants, the main objective was to 
secure the intern stability of the EU. Following the integration of Schengen Agreements in the 
EU acquis, member-states give up the control of its territory as one of the basic characteristics 
of state sovereignty. With this the EU’s migration policy was mixed with the security 
imperative for protection of external borders as focal point of this paradigm. To compensate 
this new possibility of free movement in EU, external borders were anticipated as a defence 
against the threat from out-of-area territories. Several justice and home affairs agencies were 
introduced, such as Frontex, Eurojust, Europol, numerous information systems for supporting 
the functioning of internal security and justice. Aware of the need of securing shelter and 
protection of third country citizens from prosecution, EU developed a set of legislation 
regarding refugees and asylum seekers. 
Based on the Geneva Convention on Status of Refugees from 1951, a Common 
European Asylum System was established. It is comprised of key directives on conditions for 
granting asylum, procedures of their claims and establishing standards for additional 
protection for real asylum seekers and those who are not qualified as refugees, but are facing a 
risk of suffering or abuse if returned to their countries. EU system is not a new instrument 
applying higher standards than the Geneva Convention. Along with the Dublin regulation, 
determining the member-state’s responsibility for asylum seekers, EU approached towards 
harmonization of legislation and practices.
239
 However, the final decision for asylum seekers 
is upon member-states and the chances for granting asylum differ from one state to another.  
Important step towards balancing the internal security with the external dimension on 
migration is framed in the Global migration and mobility approach. The emphasis is put not 
only on concluding re-admission agreements and fight against illegal migration, but also on 
partnership, development and acceleration of migration circulation, as well as exchange and 
strengthening of instruments for regional protection.   
                                                          
237
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 Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ 
L 180/31, 29 June 2013. 
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The Dublin Regulation is designed to determine which state is responsible for 
confronting with the asylum application of a person seeking international protection. In 
theory, it is the state in which the asylum seeker has family connections or mostly it is the 
state of entrance. This expounds the states in first line, where the majority of potential asylum 
seekers enter in Europe along with the disproportionate pressure by the refugee flow. As a 
result, geography matters. Italy and Greece are overloaded with migrants and face difficult 
efforts because of their capacities in giving assistance and adequate care. For confrontation of 
these loopholes in the asylum system, some member-states build physical barriers. Greece 
lined up a spiny fence on the border with Turkey in order to stop the refugee flow, and 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Hungary made similar actions. Although physical barriers may 
secure certain relief and lower the pressure, neither can stop the flow of migrants or to secure 
sustainable solution. While one border closes, new crossing point emerges.  
The entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new era in EU’s migration policy. 
Previously framed in the third pillar of intergovernmental cooperation, the Lisbon Treaty 
assigned the EU with new responsibilities and expanded the areas of action. Along with the 
legally binding Charter on Fundamental Rights, the new role of the European Parliament and 
broaden jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in areas previously out of its 
jurisdiction, legislation processes in areas of asylum, migration and free movement are now 
adopted through ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision and qualified majority voting). 
With such development, the Court builds its own jurisprudence, supporting the human rights 
aspect in EU’s migration and refugee policy. One of the significant novelties of the Treaty is 
the enforcement of the foreign policy and the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the appointment of the High Representative. EU was granted with legal 
personality and the possibility of concluding international relations. But the EEAS failed to 
understand the significance of migration, not only as one of the political priorities in 
negotiations with third states, but also as an important strategic question and repercussion of 
its own political choices. Also, it failed to use its legal privileges and place itself as an 
international player with power to anticipate and govern events on global level. 
Migration experts long time argument that the connections of migration with other 
external and political instruments, such as the development, trade, traffic, energetic and etc., 
significantly may increase the EU’s influence in relations with third states. The global 
approach on migration, accepted by the European Commission in negotiations with third 
states, was understood as a purpose for creating mixed political instruments on security, 
development, social and labour aspects. However, these attempts failed to deliver the 
necessary results. The migration issue is limited on re-admission agreement negotiations, visa 
policy, and fight against illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling.  
Instead of strengthening the EU’s external policy, member-states tend to follow its 
own foreign policy agenda according their strategic interests and without further 
considerations on political consequences, including the migration movements. Therefore, EU 
failed to notice the importance of migration as a strategic issue, risking serious tensions 
among member-states. More comprehensive foreign and security policy is essential for 
prevention, anticipation and confrontation with the massive migration flows. 
Based on the abovementioned, the existing EU asylum system attempts to harmonize 
rules and conditions applied for asylum seekers through all EU members-states. Key issue is 
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national decision-making and there are enormous differences among member-states in 
regulations and the compliance level with EU asylum legislation. As a result, people seeking 
asylum tend to apply in states with more favourable policies: according the European 
Commission, in 2014 and during 2015, almost ¾ of asylum applications were only in five EU 
member-states. Although the European Commission made suggestions for strengthening the 
common asylum and migration policies at EU level, so far the progress has been slow. 
 
 
5. EU AT/IN FAILURE 
 
EU policy creators failed to confront with the growing crisis. The level and speed of 
response by European institutions and member-states is completely inadequate and divided.  
European Commission Agenda on Migration adopted in May 2015 indicates that “the 
immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need”, but continues to estimate the 
migration crisis through the eyes of security in EU.
240
 Besides the endorsement of the 
Agenda, European governments continue to be agglomerate by the scale and speed of flow 
through the Mediterranean. Following the European Commission’s efforts for division of 
asylum seekers, refugees are automatically divided when the state is confronting with rapid 
flow of migrants. However, member-states are slow in executing the plan and numbers are 
still not coordinated.  
Worth mentioning that in 2015 reached more than 1.2 million people, double than in 
2014, but more 100 million people entered in EU as tourist or visitors. Besides some claims to 
the contrary, EU has Common European Asylum System containing the right for refuges and 
included in many legislation instruments. The problem is, first, that some member-states 
failed to apply its commitment standards properly; and second, when they do apply them 
properly, they do not reach to any consistent conclusions. 
Why is there a crisis in the Mediterranean, especially in Greece and Italy? The 
problem is two-fold: lack of safe and legal access to the EU and the inconsistent reception and 
inadequate distribution of asylum seekers. Most important need for one person running from 
prosecution or civil war is the feeling of safe access and protection, such as the EU. 
Besides the existence of directive calling on all member-states to fulfil minimum 
access standards for asylum seekers, some member-states failed to fulfil their responsibilities. 
Actually, Greece failed to secure adequate access for refugees (besides the funds from the 
European Refugee Fund) for which the Court of Justice and the European Court on Human 
Rights confirmed that the conditions are inhuman and degraded. Also, the Court refused the 
return of individuals to Italy without specific, individual guarantees for appropriate access 
conditions, especially for families with children. Access to protection and adequate access 
conditions are not referred only to arrivals through sea. A significant problem exists in 
managing the “green borders” preventing the flow of asylum seekers in EU. Clear example is 
the build wall by Hungary to keep the asylum seekers aside
241
 or the deadly incidents that 
                                                          
240
 A European Agenda on Migration (2015), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2015), 
240 final, Brussels, 13 May 2015.  
241
 “Hungary begins work on border fence to keep out migrants”, The Guardian, 13 July 2015. 
152 
 
occur in Spain.
242
 Then why the asylum seekers are not able to enter the EU, and if they enter, 
why are the appropriate access conditions not available for them? 
The first problem is that the dangerous refugee journeys towards EU are result of visa 
policies and sanctions for carriers. While the citizens of states that produces refugees need 
visa to enter in the EU, the criteria for issuing visa include a proof of readiness and capability 
to return to their state of origin. On the other side, refugees are legally defined according the 
international law as persons in need of protection and therefore cannot be returned in the same 
states. At the same time, commercial air and shipping companies are obligated to transport 
only those migrants to EU with valid documents, according the act for sanctions.
243
 As a 
result, with no legal access means, refugees are pushed into illegal, forced to use the services 
of smugglers and reach EU through unsafe routes. According the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, people pay from 2.000 to 10.000 US dollars to access Europe, primarily through 
neighbouring states.
244
 Dozens of people a day, especially in summer periods, cross between 
Greece and Turkey, Morocco and Spain, Tunisia and Italy. EU legislation on smuggling 
people does not simplify or solve the problem.
245
 This legislation is in effect for more than 10 
years and, but the criminalization of illegal movement of people through the Mediterranean 
seems that only increased the risks and expenses for refugees. As the ships may be used only 
once – they are confiscated on arrival – the whole amount must be covered by the refugees. 
As the captains of the smuggling ships are to be arrested and prosecuted if enter the waters of 
EU, refugees are left in ships with no sailors. 
There are no physical borders which can deter someone who is ready to risk its life. 
Only complete despair and lack of alternative may push someone to insecure, highly risky 
adventure with unforeseeable end. Neither it is likely that the partial, separate solutions, 
recklessly invented by policy-makers, along with unaccepted scenes of migrants trying to 
reach Europe, may cause a long-term effect. With its potential to disturb the political stability 
and create deeper division among EU member-states, along with the wider social polarization 
between those driven by human tragedy and other that point out on its overloaded capacities 
and the impossibility to integrate the migrants already living in EU, the crisis will more and 
more polarize the society and may put a long-term stamp on the entire history of Europe. 
 
6. MAIN CHALLENGES 
 
EU member-states are facing numerous challenges, in political and legal meaning, 
thus requiring more effective response. First, no one should underestimate the challenge 
caused by the scale of the crisis. The movement of people, differences in their profiles, states 
of origin, vulnerability and the dynamic nature of their entry routes and means they use 
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represents complex situation that requires particular effort. For Greece, Italy, Croatia and 
Hungary – as EU member-states in first line – the size and speed of flow simply overloaded 
their asylum centres in period when their economies have also been weak.   
Second, to identify those in need of international help is very complex. While the 
refugee status of those fleeing from conflict areas is more than clear, others in need of 
international protection may not enter the frame of the legal definition of refugee. To 
adequately confront with large number of people arriving through illegal channels and whose 
individual claims for asylum are additionally rejected is source-intensive. States of access are 
in big challenge in the re-admission process of those not granted with asylum, including the 
insecure conditions in states of origin or rejection by their governments to accept them back. 
Third, there is a significant financial burden for states with large flow of refugees and 
others with granted international protection regarding integration support (housing, education, 
health and other services). Having in mind the slow economic growth in most of the EU 
member-states, this is not the burden they are willing to take. Also there are concerns 
regarding how long the refugees will stay in Europe and how long they will need such 
support. Global trends indicate that most of the new arrivals stay for years: from the entire 
refugee population, more than half were displaced for more than 10 years. Therefore, if 
provisions for integration support are used sooner, then refugees will sooner become 
independent, get employment and pay taxes. However, most of the governments are 
concerned regarding emergency efforts for welfare services, possible labour competition and 
the impact on social cohesion.  
Fourth, further movement of refugees and migrants in EU is key concern for most of 
the governments. Many refugees and asylum seekers suffered multiple resettlements even 
before the journeys to Europe and with adequate integration support they would probably 
invested in building its own life in states where they are formally relocated. Inevitably there 
are individuals travelling in other states where they have relatives or where they believe that 
their economic possibilities are better, whether through employment or welfare support.  
Fifth, public opinion on migration in Europe is deeply divided, influencing both on 
government policies and integration prospects for refugees and migrants. Media images 
transmitting the horrible risks refugees from Syria are facing in order to arrive in Europe to a 
large extent changed the public speech, but the anti-migration policy remains key issue in 
right-wing policies in Europe. 
Finally, maintaining the coherent approach of 28 member-states shows to be 
extremely difficult. Although there is acknowledgement in need of wider EU response, the 
crisis also united political and economic divisions in Europe. Some Central and Eastern 
European states denied what was seen as a leading attitude from Germany; arguments 
regarding migration movements again heat up the tensions between Serbia and Croatia, 
Greece and Macedonia; Great Britain refused to participate in the EU relocation plan of 
120.000 migrant from Greece, Hungary and Italy, as agreed on 22
nd
 of September 2015. 
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7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Dublin should be replaced with unforced, voluntarily based and responsible system 
adjusted with fundamental rights for distribution of asylum claims. Legal distribution in EU 
must secure that the asylum seekers are accepted in a manner which is fair, both on the 
dignity of asylum seekers and the solidarity of member-states. But the distribution will fail if 
there are no appropriate access facilities for asylum seekers in EU member-states and fair 
asylum procedure. These two issues must work together – no distribution will work if asylum 
seekers find themselves in humiliated conditions. 
The problem with migration is long overdue and it reached its glorification with the 
scale of current migration wave. Also, it is unanimously acknowledged that the sustainable 
solutions must address the reasons in its roots. It seems that the situation only gets worse, 
proved by the large number of refugees and migrants trying to reach Europe. In absence of 
global initiatives and sustainable political solutions, major political crisis influencing the 
Middle East will further continue to generate refugees and migrants. Unlike other states, EU 
is especially concerned, having in mind its geographic density. 
EU leaders are facing with huge refugee crisis and must face with it as common 
European challenge, consistent with their collective and individual responsibilities. Never 
before was Europe in an urgent need of common response towards the flow of refugees. Still, 
even the need of such actions, some leaders are determined on insisting towards isolation 
policies. For example, more refugees arrive on Greek islands, where humanitarian assistance 
and basic needs are lacking. Greek government should take responsibility, but because that is 
not possible at the moment, EU should step forward and to secure safe crossing and 
relocation. At the time, these travelling through this route are forced to leave the EU and 
travel illegally through the Balkans again risking their lives. The current migration crisis 
describes the attention of how domestic politics of individual states are undermining the 
importance of fair and thoroughly debate. Because of the rise of anti-migration, right-wing 
parties in Europe, migration became a subject of political dispute in almost every EU country. 
It is clear that there is no single solution, neither single approach.  
With massive unrests and with rise of conflicts, the number of migrants will certainly 
rise. First and foremost, the situation in Middle East needs improvement by the entire 
international community. Europe must lead the way in establishing the stage for an 
international conference and adoption of resolutions for Syria and others. Moreover, all major 
powers should take on the responsibility for flow of refugees. Countries in the region 
accepting large part of refugees because of their geographic density should be supported by 
developed states with financial, technical, humanitarian and other necessary support.  
The new European Agenda on Migration certainly opened new directions, but so far 
with short use. The Agenda proposes relocation of migrants (for those already in EU) and 
resettlement (for those outside the EU) according established criteria. Share of responsibilities 
and fair division is necessary and should be compulsory for all EU member-states, having in 
mind the different parameters, such as the size of the country, population, GDP, 
unemployment and political situation. This will avoid situations where some member-states in 
first line, along with those receiving large part of asylum seekers bear the burden of migrants 
flow. Other side of the Agenda is the return of illegal migrants and the rejected asylum 
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seekers. The return is conditional in third states with re-admission agreements and by 
respecting its commitments, they should be offered with more motivated and better conditions 
for fulfilling their obligations. With no possibilities for brighter future, those returned will use 
all means to return to Europe Debate should decide what to do with those not qualified for 
asylum, but not able to return to their countries. 
EU must establish coherent and comprehensive migration policy based on human 
rights, making the mobility central instrument in order to enable Europe to return its borders. 
All member-states should be responsible actors and supporters for comprehensive approach 
and collective legal actions for protection of rights, whether a refugee or asylum seeker. 
Building walls and setting fences, using tear-gas and other forms of violence against migrants 
and asylum seekers, detentions, poor access to basic means as shelter, food, and water or 
hatred speech would not stop the migrants of coming or trying to reach Europe and may only 
shift the pressure from one point to another. EU member-states must rely on humanity and 
therefore several recommendations are of great significance: 
 Entire EU, not some member-states, should accept that the Dublin system no longer 
functions and new approach is needed. 
 In line with their commitments, EU member-states must secure that the protection of 
all migrants, especially women, children and other vulnerable groups, regardless of 
their migration status, is the basis for decision-making and action. 
 Member-states must adopt coherent, long-term and comprehensive strategy dedicated 
on reasons and consequences of the current flow. 
 Alternative means for the refugees are needed in order to arrive safely in EU without 
risking their lives.  
 To secure that member-state responsibilities are fulfilled and refugees are not forced to 
travel to other member-states and may live in dignity while their asylum application is 
being processed. 
 Make use of voluntary mechanisms and expulsion of forced mechanisms for transfer 
of asylum seekers to member-states.  
 Agreement regarding distribution of refugees and determination of asylum claims in 
fair manner both for the refugees and member-states. 
 In long-term, to establish EU Agency for Migration, Asylum and Protection with 
responsibilities for securing coherent and consistent determination of asylum claims. 
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